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This paper examines how web design firms in the emergent new media industry probe and 
experiment with possible forms and sources of value giving shape to the new economy.  Focusing 
on the collaborative engineering of cross-disciplinary web-design project teams, we examine how 
websites emerge as provisional settlements among the heterogeneous disciplines as they negotiate 
working compromises across competing performance criteria. 
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Distributing Intelligence and Organizing Diversity in New Media Projects 
 
Monique Girard and David Stark 
 
 
Introduction:   Construction Sites  
 
Starting in 1995 and accelerating to a peak in the Spring of Year 2000, Manhattan had many more 
construction sites than usual.  But although these new construction sites had subcontractors, they 
had no cement; they had architects, but no steel; they had engineers and designers and builders 
who built for retail firms, financial services, museums, government, and cultural institutions, but 
no one ever set foot into their constructions.  These architects were information architects, the 
engineers were software and systems engineers, the designers were interactive designers, and the 
builders were site builders – all working in the Internet consulting firms that were the 
construction companies for the digital real estate boom that marks the turn of the millennium.   
 
From the Spring of 1999 through the Spring of 2001, we were fortunate to be able to observe one 
of these startup firms and watch its website construction projects, not through a plexiglass 
peephole, but close-up as ethnographic researchers.  What we found, in almost every aspect, was 
a project perpetually “under construction.”  At the same time that the software engineers and 
interactive designers were constructing websites, they were also constructing the firm and the 
project form. And this relentless redesign of the organization was occurring simultaneously with 
the construction, emergence, consolidation, dissipation, and reconfiguration of the industry itself. 
“What is New Media?” This was the question we encountered numerous times scribbled on 
whiteboards in brainstorming sessions during or just prior to our meetings in various interactive 
companies.   Or, as one of our informants posed the question, “People are always trying to come 
up with a metaphor for a website.  Is it a magazine, a newspaper, a TV commercial, a 
community?  Is it a store?  You know, it’s none of these … and its all of these and others, in 
many variations and combinations.  So, there’s endless debate.”  Of one thing you could be 
certain: if you were sure you knew the answer, the pace of organizational innovation to make new 
business models, the pace of technological innovation to make new affordances, and the pace of 
genre innovation to make new conceptualizations had likely combined to make your answer 
already obsolete.   
 
What is a new media firm? In answering the question, the startups did not start from scratch. The 
form of the firm and the shape of projects were borrowed from prior existing models.  Many were 
shaped around the consulting firm model; others adopted the model of an architectural firm, an 
advertising agency, a film or television studio, a software engineering or systems integration 
company, a design studio, a venture capital firm, or the editorial model of a magazine.1 Forming 
the basic template, these models were repurposed for new functionalities as well as recombined 
for new purposes (e.g., consulting model + systems integrator,  media production studio + venture 
capital model, etc.). 
 
                                                 
1 These models are frequently made explicit in the names of firms and echoed in their décor, e.g., Plumb 
Design (architecture), Agency.com (ad agency), RG/A Studios,  (design studio), Concrete Media (magazine 
+ construction company), and so on.  The décor of the offices of Pseudo in New York and Razorfish in 
NYC and San Francisco might seem to break out of any model – except that resembling a trendy nightclub 
is part of a branding strategy that shocking the corporate client can be a source of reassurance that the 
product will be unquestionably hip.   
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But whatever the choice of model (and note that, with few exceptions, most firms studiously 
avoided the “construction company” moniker), every new media firm that was in the business of 
constructing websites had to cope not only with the problem that the field was in flux but also that 
every successful innovation in carving a niche, creating a new product, defining a new business 
model, or introducing a new technology could be replicated by competitors. Unlike other high 
tech firms in fields such as biotechnology where patents could protect intellectual property, in the 
new media field innovations were not likely to yield a stream of rents.  Under circumstances of 
low barriers to entry (because innovations – in genre, technology, and organization – could be 
easily assimilated), firms were forced to be relentlessly innovative.  
 
Thus, firms could not prosper simply by learning from their construction projects.  It was not 
enough to master the project form, to codify, routinize, or even perfect what they had been doing.  
If you locked-in to what you had done previously, regardless of how much you improved 
performance by your existing criterion, you would be locked out of markets that were changing 
rapidly.  On the other side, if you spent all your organizational resources searching for new 
products and processes, always and everywhere exploring for new opportunities, you would never 
be able to exploit your existing knowledge.  For the new media companies, March’s (1991) 
problem of “exploration versus exploitation” could be rephrased as the problem of staying ahead 
of the curve without getting behind on your deadlines.    
 
When coping with complex foresight horizons (Lane and Maxfield 1996), where dislocations can 
be anticipated in general but are unpredictable in their specific contours, firms must be 
perpetually poised to pursue innovation.  They must build organizations that are not only capable 
of learning but also capable of suspending accepted knowledge and established procedures to 
redraw cognitive categories and reconfigure relational boundaries – both at the level of the 
products and services produced by the firm and at the level of the working practices and 
production processes within the firm. Organizations must innovate in ways that allow them to re-
cognize, redefine, recombine, and redeploy resources for further innovation.  In other words, 
organizations must “invest in forms” (Thevenot) that allow for easy reconfiguration and hence 
minimize the costs of “divestment” or reorganization.  Such capacities for organizational 
innovation must go beyond the discovery of new means to carry out existing functions more 
effectively and efficiently.  Under conditions of radical uncertainty, organizations that simply 
improve their adaptive fit to the current environment risk sacrificing adaptability in subsequent 
dislocations (Grabher 1997;  Grabher and Stark 1997).   
 
Organizational ecologists have long held that adaptability is promoted by the diversity of 
organizations within a population.  The perspective adopted here, by contrast, is that adaptability 
is promoted by the organization of diversity within an enterprise.  The adaptive potential of 
organizational diversity may be most fully realized when different organizational principles co-
exist in an active rivalry within the firm.  By rivalry, we do not refer to competing camps and 
factions, but to coexisting logics and frames of action.  The organization of diversity is an active 
and sustained engagement in which there is more than one way to organize, label, interpret, and 
evaluate the same or similar activity.  Rivalry fosters cross-fertilization.  It increases the 
possibilities of long-term adaptability by better search -- "better" because the complexity that it 
promotes and the lack of simple coherence that it tolerates increase the diversity of options.    
 
We explore these themes by examining the collaborative interactions among the multi-
disciplinary project teams working in a Silicon Alley new media firm.  First, we establish the 
highly uncertain environment within which new media firms operate, with the paramount 
uncertainty being the shifting content, parameters, and value of the new media industry itself. 
What is the meaning and where is the value of new media?  We then sketch the organizational 
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features required of new media firms to deftly reassess the shifting terrain and adjust their 
positioning and strategy.  Most salient among these features is the organization of diversity 
through lateral accountability, properties constitutive of a new mode of organizing that we 
characterize as heterarchy.  We then explore the dynamics of heterarchical organization by 
examining the process of collaborative engineering involved in the construction of websites. 
Prominence given to the competing evaluative and performance criteria specific to the multiple 
disciplines is matched by a scaling back of administrative hierarchy.  In place of directives, the 
multiple disciplines engage in a discursive pragmatics in which the disciplined judgment needed 
to do a good job is balanced with compromise needed to get the job done.  Sharing the 
responsibility for getting the work done, one fights to promote the values of one’s discipline, but 
one yields out of allegiance to the project and the firm.  By distributing authority, the firm yields 
control of disciplined argument but wins the competitive edge that results by cultivating a 
diversity of options in face of uncertainty.  
 
 
An Ecology of Value 
 
Silicon Alley: new firms in an uncertain environment 
 
Silicon Alley is a (post)industrial district that can be thought of first as a place, running south of 
41st Street along Broadway through the Flatiron District and SoHo into Chelsea and down to Wall 
Street.  But it is also, and just as importantly, a social/industrial space between Wall Street and 
Midtown, linking the financial district to the traditional big advertising firms and the traditional 
big media companies in broadcast and publishing.  In this case, the physical place and the social 
space are, not coincidentally, isomorphic.  By 1999, new media was one of New York’s fastest 
growing sectors with almost 100,000 full-time equivalent employees in Manhattan alone (that is, 
more than the city’s traditional publishing and traditional advertising industries combined) and 
with an estimated 8,500 new media companies in the larger New York City area.2  In that same 
year, the New York new media industry produced revenues of $16.8 billion and generated $1.5 
billion in venture capital funding and $3.5 billion in IPO funding. 
 
Bolstered by industry associations, promoted by government officials, and exuberantly 
championed by its trade publications, the public face of these new media companies showed a 
brash self-confidence.  But they were acutely aware that they were operating in a highly uncertain 
environment. Their statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) upon filing for 
a Initial Public Offering (IPO) provide a chorus of this uncertainty.  (All statements in bold or 
italics are quotations from  SEC filings by Silicon Alley new media firms.)   
 
Among the risk factors reported by these new media firms are some standard items commonly 
found in almost all SEC filings.  More interesting are those factors common to early stage 
companies in which the elapsed time from start-up to IPO is brief: 
 
1) We have an extremely limited operating history and may face difficulties encountered 
by early stage companies in new and rapidly evolving markets. 
 
2) Our recent growth has strained our managerial and operational resources. 
                                                 
2 All figures in this paragraph are from the 3rd New York  New Media Industry Survey, sponsored by the 
New York New Media Association and conducted by PriceWaterhouseCoopers.  Numbers of jobs listed are 
full-time jobs plus the full-time equivalent of part-time jobs and freelancers. 
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Our recent acquisitions have created financial and other challenges, which, if  
 not addressed or resolved, could have an adverse effect on our business.  We acquired five 
businesses during 1998 and completed our merger with [another new media firm] in January 
1999.  We are experiencing certain financial, operational and managerial challenges in 
integrating these acquired companies. This process of integration … will require the 
dedication of management and other resources, which may distract management's attention 
from our other operations.   
 
For some new media firms, the liabilities of newness were extreme, as in this case where almost 
all the senior personnel were newcomers to the company: 
 
3) Several members of senior management have only recently joined the company. 
Several members of our senior management joined us in 1998 and 1999, [this from a March 
1999 filing] including our Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operating Officer, Senior Vice 
President for Sponsorship, General Counsel, Vice President for Finance, Controller and 
Chief Accounting Officer, Senior Vice President for Human Resources, and the Chief 
Technology Officer. These individuals have not previously worked together and are becoming 
integrated as a management team. 
 
In a tight labor market, loss of “old hands” is a real threat and, in this knowledge-based industry, 
would spell a loss of the company’s primary assets, especially where contacts to clients are 
contacts through personnel:    
 
4) The loss of our professionals would make it difficult to complete existing  
projects and bid for new projects, which could adversely affect our business  
and results of operations.    
Our business is labor intensive, and our success depends on identifying, hiring, training and 
retaining professionals.  Competition for personnel in our industry is intense.  If a significant 
number of our current employees or any of our senior managers or key project managers 
leave, we may be unable to complete or retain existing projects or bid for new projects of 
similar scope and revenue. 
 
 
Moreover, assets are not contained within the boundaries of the firm but are distributed across a 
network of interdependent firms. In choosing partners, alliances, and technologies, winners 
cannot be known in advance:  
 
5) We may not be able to deliver various services if third parties fail to provide reliable 
software, systems, and related services to us.  
We are dependent on various third parties for software, systems and related  
services.  For example, we rely on [another Internet company’s] software for the placement 
of advertisements and [another Internet company] for personal home pages and e-mail. 
Several of the third parties that provide software and services to us have a limited operating 
history, have relatively immature technology and are themselves dependent on reliable 
delivery of services from others.   
 
6) Our market is characterized by rapidly changing technologies, frequent new  
product and service introductions, evolving industry standards, and changing customer 
demands. The recent growth of the Internet and intense competition in our industry 
exacerbate these market characteristics.  
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We need to keep pace with changing communications technologies in order to provide 
effective digital communications solutions. Our success depends on our ability to keep pace 
with the rapid changes occurring in communications technologies and the new and improved 
devices and services that result from these changes.  
 
 
In a newly emerging field, measuring assets is also complicated by the absence of industry 
standards and by uncertain government regulations:  
 
7) The market for internet advertising is uncertain. 
We expect to derive a substantial amount of our revenues from sponsorships and advertising 
for the foreseeable future, and demand and market acceptance for  
Internet advertising solutions is uncertain.   There are currently no standards for the 
measurement of the effectiveness of Internet advertising, and the industry may need to 
develop standard measurements to support and promote Internet advertising as a significant 
advertising medium. 
 
8) Government regulation and legal uncertainties could add additional costs to doing 
business on the Internet.  
 Both the U.S., at the state, local and federal government levels, and the European Union and 
foreign governmental bodies have recently passed legislation relating to the Internet.  … we 
are not certain how our  business will be impacted by them.  Several telecommunications 
companies have petitioned the Federal Communications Commission to regulate Internet 
service providers and online service providers in a manner similar to long distance telephone 
carriers and to impose access fees on those companies. This could increase the cost of 
transmitting data over the Internet. Moreover, it may take years to determine the extent to 
which existing laws relating to issues such as property ownership, libel and personal privacy 
are applicable to the Internet. 
 
Being a frontrunner in an emerging field is only a temporary advantage where there are few 
barriers to entry, no patentable rents, and larger and more established firms ready to exploit the 
profitable activities revealed by the trials and errors of the pioneering startups:  
 
9) We compete in a new and highly competitive market that has low barriers to  
entry.  
 
10) We do not own any patented technology that precludes or inhibits competitors from 
entering the information technology services market. 
 
11) We expect competition to intensify as the market evolves. We compete with: 
Internet service firms; technology consulting firms; technology integrators; strategic 
consulting firms; and in-house information technology, marketing and design 
departments of our potential clients.    
 
12) Many of our competitors have longer operating histories, larger client  
bases, longer relationships with clients, greater brand or name recognition and 
significantly greater financial, technical, marketing and public relations  
resources than we have.  
 
Above all, will e-commerce prove viable?  Will the Internet as we know it be sustainable?  Will it 
continue to grow?  And might it mutate into unpredictable forms? 
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13) Our business may be indirectly impacted if the number of users on the Internet does 
not increase or if commerce over the Internet does not become more accepted and 
widespread.  
The use and acceptance of the Internet may not increase for a number of reasons, including: 
actual or perceived lack of security of information, such as credit card  numbers;  high cost 
or lack of availability of access; congestion of traffic or other usage delays on the Internet;  
inconsistent quality of service or the lack of availability of cost-effective, high-speed service; 
possible outages or other damage to the Internet. 
 
14) If the Internet is rendered obsolete or less important by faster, more efficient 
technologies, we must be prepared to offer non-Internet-based solutions or risk losing 
current and potential clients. In  addition, to the extent that mobile phones, pagers, 
personal digital assistants or other devices become important aspects of digital 
communications solutions, we need to have the technological expertise to incorporate 
them into our solutions. 
 
Hence, at the height of exuberance of the Internet bubble, the following sober assessment: 
 




Searching for value in an evolving ecology 
 
Our litany of risk factors in the Silicon Alley IPO filing statements points to the difficulties of 
evaluating Internet stocks.  But over and above the problem of the market figuring out what these 
firms are worth is an even more interesting uncertainty: how do the firms themselves figure out 
what is the basis of their worth?  To be clear, the problem is not in establishing the level of their 
market capitalization, which in any case is set by the market, but of surveying their actual and 
potential activities to discover what they are doing (or could be doing) that is of value.   
 
Many of the Silicon Alley new media firms that were formed during the initial expansion of the 
Web around 1995 began their operations designing websites.  Suddenly, every corporation, it 
seemed needed a website.   This surge in demand for the skills of designers and programmers 
created a sizeable niche, with relatively few players, and a yawning knowledge gap between 
producers and clients.  The folk history of the industry is strewn with stories by the start-up 
entrepreneurs who tell of their early experiences with mid-level corporate managers who had 
never surfed the Web but who had been instructed by senior executives of major corporations to 
“get us a website!”   
 
Many of the twenty-something new media pioneers were rebounding from a string of marginal 
jobs, having graduated from college after the ’87 stock market crash and the following recession 
that devastated the New York City economy. With the sudden expansion of the Web, their 
generational position, which had seemed such a liability, now became an asset: having grown up 
in the computer age, they were quick to grasp the implications of the Web.  Equipped with a 
couple of PCs, an Internet connection, and the rudiments of HTML they could make some kind of 
living, doing something they enjoyed, while making up the rules as they went along (Kait and 
Weiss 2001). Here was an opportunity to prove their worth – in circumstances where their 
marginality to the corporate world could be recast into a source of authority as legitimate 
interpreters of an alternative medium.  With nothing to lose and with little or no experience in the 
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corporate world, they met corporate executives who had little or no experience in the emerging 
field of new media.  Frequently negotiating in their apartments-qua-offices, the six figure 
contracts they landed for building websites were instant proof (sometimes surprising in 
magnitude) of their value.  
 
If the corporate world was not only paying attention but also willing to pay, what was it paying 
for?  In these early days, their corporate clients were anxious to establish a presence on the web, 
imagining websites as little more than billboards alongside the information superhighway.  But, 
as the new media entrepreneurs were introduced to the business operations of the firms, their 
interactions with various units yielded new insights about the capabilities of interactive websites 
as innovative corporate tools.  Looking inside marketing departments, they realized that the web 
could provide new kinds of information about customers; in interactions with production 
departments, they learned that the web could establish new kinds of relationships to suppliers; 
and probing technology departments they recognized how the web could exponentially extended 
the network of information transfer well beyond the task of integrating proprietary data.   
 
Although they were being paid for design work, the new entrepreneurs concluded that the real 
value they brought to the deal and to the client was as consultants.   And so they adjusted their 
positioning.  As “web shops” they were like construction companies, building in a digital medium 
to be sure, but nonetheless basically working to the specifications of the client.  Reconfigured as 
“web developers,” they were in the business of advising clients about how to develop an overall 
strategy on and for the web.  The new mottos and redesigned logos on their own websites told the 
story:  “Interactive Strategy,” for example, and “digital.change.management.”   
 
The new management consulting/web design hybrid took the web developers more deeply and 
more intensively inside the organizations of their corporate clients (as the price of a well-designed 
corporate website rose into seven figures).  And this increased interaction brought them into new 
fields with yet different identities. Their increased interaction with marketing departments, for 
example, resulted in “interactive advertising” and brought them onto the domain of the midtown 
advertising agencies.  As they began to design intranets and virtual offices for flexible 
communication within the corporation, the web developers learned that their programming skills 
in graphic design had to be augmented with programming skills for the “information architecture” 
of knowledge management.  And with the development of e-commerce, the front end of the 
website (the interface with the customer) quickly became more integrated with the entire 
organization and its “legacy systems” working on older operating platforms in production, 
purchasing, billing, and data archiving.  To deliver a comprehensive product that linked the user 
interface to the “back end,” the graphic designers, thus, also found themselves moving onto the 
terrain of the system integrators.   
 
And so from graphic designers the web developers had evolved into interactive designers/ 
management consultants/ advertising agencies/ information architects/ system integrators.   Some 
of them were now being approached by a new kind of client – not simply major corporations who 
needed a website to augment their bricks and mortar facilities but also start-up entrepreneurs with 
no physical plant and equipment but ideas to build click-and-order operations.  Whereas the mid-
level executives of the earlier period had come with a corporate charge to “build me a website,” 
the exclusively e-commerce entrepreneurs now came with venture capital backing to “build me a 
company.”   The entrepreneurs for galoshes.com, soapsudsonline, YouNameIt.com brought 
financing, contacts to suppliers, and usually some modicum of marketing experience in a specific 
line of goods; but everything else from server farms to user interfaces, from e-carts to returns 
policies, from supplier interfaces to knowledge of online consumer buying practices rested in the 
knowledge base of the web developer.   
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After creating one or two such virtual companies for fees, the web developers were confronted 
yet again with the problem of value: why simply charge a fee for a professional service when so 
much of the value of the virtual company resulted from their efforts?   The answer: in addition to 
fee for service, acquire partial equity in the new online companies.   But things were usually not 
so additive, and the resulting deals often involved trading off some part of fees for equity.  So, to 
protect their “investments” in deferred fees, some web developers began incubating their client 
companies, working closely with the managers of the start-up ventures to guide them to the 
market.    In doing so, the web developers entered yet a new field of skills.  In taking on a new 
project it was no longer enough to assess whether a new client could pay its bill.  As equity 
holders, their value as a firm now rested in part on their ability to evaluate the potential of new 
ventures, their profitability, and/or their marketability.  The more they began to think of their 
product as building a company, the more they had to consider the built company as a product, i.e. 
the likelihood that it could be sold whether through an IPO or to another round of investors.   As 
such, in addition to all their other new identities, these web developers were taking on some of 
the roles of venture capitalists.   Whereas the Silicon Alley new media firms were once digital 
construction companies, now they joined the venerable New York City tradition of real estate 
developers – developing properties on the digital landscape.   
 
But as the web developers evolved in a zig-zag course of learning where the value is, other actors, 
of course, were doing the same.   The major midtown ad agencies, for example, established 
interactive units or spun off their own dedicated interactive agencies;  the big consulting firms did 
not leave the field of interactive management to the new media start-ups but moved aggressively 
into the field; and the big systems integrators developed their own e-commerce units and 
launched new initiatives in the lucrative business-to-business (B2B) web development field.   
From a scarcely populated niche, the field of new media services was now filled with more 
established competitors, coming to it from multiple starting points.  
 
Meanwhile, the nascent industry was faced with new waves of technological innovation 
disrupting its emerging digital ecologies.  On one side, players in the field were anticipating 
major breakthroughs in the development of broadband technologies which promised the 
convergence in one device of the various functionalities now parceled across your television, 
computer monitor, stereo, VCR, and telephone.   But just when one might think that this hails a 
new “single appliance” era, we saw, on the other side, the proliferation of myriad electronic 
devices (e.g., wireless palm pilots, and the like) through which you can receive and transmit 
digital information in a mobile environment. 
 
These simultaneous processes of convergence and divergence would have two consequences.  
First, the joint appearance of broadband technologies, on one side, and multi-appliance mobile 
interactivity, on the other, would have important consequences for the website genre form.  That 
is, just at the point that the website genre seemed to be stabilizing, that moment of stabilization 
was revealed as a tiny moment in the history of the medium.  Second, as bandwidth was 
expanding to broadband proportions, another set of actors entered the field – cable companies, 
network broadcasters, recording companies, and telecommunications firms. Sony, NBC, AT&T, 
and Telefonica (the Spanish telecommunications firm), for example, were among the major 
corporations who moved most aggressively. They were joined, with the arrival of mobile 
interactivity (from Wired to the “wireless revolution”), by new hardware manufacturers such as 
Nokia, Ericsson, and Palm, Inc. (as well as rapidly growing companies such as Symbol 
Technologies, makers of hand-held, bar-code devices).   
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This crowding of the field happened at the same time as its economic contraction.  As the IPO 
market for dot.coms slowed and then stopped altogether, firms that had put too many resources 
into developing companies instead of developing competencies found themselves with worthless 
holdings.  Those who had scored early successes by tapping into the Internet Gold Rush with a 
timely IPO and who had pegged their worth according to their soaring stock values (from $12 to 
$120 in months or even weeks), now found (with their shares trading in pennies) that allowing the 
market to be the measure of their worth could just as easily undervalue as overvalue a company’s 
actual performance.  Those who had turned away clients in 1998 and 1999 because “our cultures 
just don’t fit”, now found themselves making pitches in the most improbable places.  And those 
who hoped that their reputations – as capable professionals who delivered value on deadline – 
would help them weather the storm now found themselves competing for clients that were not 
only fewer in number but also much more cautious about allocating resources for Internet 




Companies striving to make headway amidst such dizzying impermanence were in constant 
search of that “sweet spot” which consisted of finding the right temporary permanence to commit 
to – the winning clients, technology, marketing strategy – that would position them favorably for 
the next imminent shift of course.   The challenge for these companies was not only to have the 
operational flexibility needed to change direction quickly; they needed to maximize their capacity 
to recognize opportunities and realize their promise, not only by exploiting their immediate 
benefits but by exploring them as openings to new opportunities.  To enhance their innovative 
capacity, new media firms experimented with new organizational forms that we characterize as 
heterarchy.      
 
Heterarchy represents a new mode of organizing that is neither market nor hierarchy: whereas 
hierarchies involve relations of dependence and markets involve relations of independence, 
heterarchies involve relations of interdependence. As the term suggests, heterarchies are 
characterized by minimal hierarchy and by organizational heterogeneity.   
 
Heterarchy’s twinned features are a response to the increasing complexity of the firm’s foresight 
horizons (Lane and Maxfield, 1996) or of its "fitness landscape" (Kauffman 1993).   In 
relentlessly changing organizations where, at the extreme, there is uncertainty even about what 
product the firm will be producing in the near future, the strategy horizon of the firm is 
unpredictable and its fitness landscape is rugged. To cope with these uncertainties, instead of 
concentrating its resources for strategic planning among a narrow set of senior executives or 
delegating that function to a specialized department, firms may undergo a radical decentralization 
in which virtually every unit becomes engaged in innovation. That is, in place of specialized 
search routines in which some departments are dedicated to exploration, while others are confined 
to exploiting existing knowledge, the functions of exploration are generalized throughout the 
organization. The search for new markets, for example, is no longer the sole province of the 
marketing department, if units responsible for purchase and supply are also scouting the 
possibilities for qualitatively new inputs that can open up new product lines. 
 
These developments increase interdependencies between divisions, departments, and work teams 
within the firm. But because of the greater complexity of these feedback loops, coordination 
cannot be engineered, controlled, or managed hierarchically. The results of interdependence are 
to increase the autonomy of work units from central management. Yet at the same time, more 
complex interdependence heightens the need for fine-grained coordination across the increasingly 
autonomous units.  
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These pressures are magnified by dramatic changes in the sequencing of activities within 
production relations. As product cycles shorten from years to months, the race to new markets 
calls into question the strict sequencing of design and execution. Because of strong first-mover 
advantages, in which the first actor to introduce a new product (especially one that establishes a 
new industry standard), captures inordinate market share by reaping increasing returns, firms that 
wait to begin production until design is completed will be penalized in competition. Like the 
production of “B movies” in which filming begins before the script is completed, successful 
strategies integrate conception and execution, with significant aspects of the production process 
beginning even before design is finalized.  
   
Production relations are even more radically altered in processes analyzed by Sabel and Dorf 
(1998) as simultaneous engineering. Conventional design is sequential, with subsystems that are 
presumed to be central designed in detail first, setting the boundary conditions for the design of 
lower-ranking components. In simultaneous engineering, by contrast, separate project teams 
develop all the subsystems concurrently. In such concurrent design, the various project teams 
engage in an ongoing mutual monitoring, as innovations produce multiple, sometimes competing, 
proposals for improving the overall design. 
 
Thus, increasingly rugged fitness landscapes yield increasingly complex interdependencies that in 
turn yield increasingly complex coordination challenges. Where search is no longer 
departmentalized but is instead generalized and distributed throughout the organization, and 
where design is no longer compartmentalized but deliberated and distributed throughout the 
production process, the solution is distributed authority (Powell, 1996).   
 
Under circumstances of simultaneous engineering where the very parameters of a project are 
subject to deliberation and change across units, authority is no longer delegated vertically but 
rather emerges laterally. As one symptom of these changes, managers socialized in an earlier 
regime frequently express their puzzlement to researchers: "There’s one thing I can’t figure out. 
Who’s my boss?" Under conditions of distributed authority, managers might still "report to" their 
superiors; but increasingly, they are accountable to other work teams. Success at simultaneous 
engineering thus depends on learning by mutual monitoring within relations of lateral 
accountability.    
 
As it shifts from search routines to a situation in which search is generalized, the heterarchical 
firm is redrawing internal boundaries, regrouping assets, and perpetually reinventing itself. Under 
circumstances of rapid technological change and volatility of products and markets, it seems there 
is no one best solution. If one could be rationally chosen and resources devoted to it alone, the 
benefits of its fleeting superiority would not compensate for the costs of subsequent missed 
opportunities. Because managers hedge against these uncertainties, the outcomes are hybrid 
forms (Sabel, 1990). Good managers do not simply commit themselves to the array that keeps the 
most options open; instead, they create an organizational space open to the perpetual redefinition 
of what might constitute an option. Rather than a rational choice among a set of known options, 
we find practical action fluidly redefining what the options might be. Management becomes the 
art of facilitating organizations that can reorganize themselves.  
 
This capacity for self-redefinition is grounded in the organizational heterogeneity that 
characterizes heterarchies. Heterarchies are complex adaptive systems because they interweave a 
multiplicity of organizing principles. The new organizational forms are heterarchical not only 
because they have flattened hierarchy, but also because they are the sites of competing and 
coexisting value systems. The greater interdependence of increasingly autonomous work teams 
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results in a proliferation of performance criteria. Distributed authority not only implies that units 
will be accountable to each other, but also that each will be held to accountings in multiple 
registers. The challenge of a new media firm, for example, is to create a sufficiently common culture 
to facilitate communication among the designers, business strategists, and technologists that make up 
interdisciplinary teams – without suppressing the distinctive identities of each.3  A robust, lateral 
collaboration flattens hierarchy without flattening diversity. Heterarchies create wealth by 
inviting more than one way of evaluating worth.  
 
This aspect of heterarchy builds on frank Knight's (1921) distinction between risk, where the 
distribution of outcomes can be expressed in probabilistic terms, and uncertainty, where outcomes 
are incalculable.  Whereas neoclassical economics reduces all cases to risk, Knight argued that a 
world of generalized probabilistic knowledge of the future leaves no place for profit (as a 
particular residual revenue that is not contractualizable because it is not susceptible to measure ex 
ante) and hence no place for the entrepreneur.  Properly speaking, the entrepreneur is not 
rewarded for risk-taking but, instead, is rewarded for an ability to exploit uncertainty.  The French 
school of the "economics of conventions" (Boltanski and Thevenot 1991) demonstrate that 
institutions are social technologies for transforming uncertainty into calculate problems;  but they 
leave unexamined the possibility of uncertainty about which institutions ("regime of worth") is 
operative in a given situation.  Knight's conception of entrepreneurship as the exploitation of 
uncertainty posed within the heterarchy framework is thus rendered: Entrepreneurship is the 
ability to keep multiple regimes of worth in play and to exploit the resulting ambiguity.   
 
The Firm and the Project Form 
NetKnowHow 
 
Over a two year period, we observed the organizational features of heterarchy in practice at 
NetKnowHow, a pseudonymous new media startup firm in Silicon Alley navigating the 
uncharted Internet territory.  NetKnowHow is a full service Internet consulting firm.  It was 
founded in 1995 by two young entrepreneurs each with experience in the large corporate sector 
(traditional consulting and traditional media).  In its formative years it was a software 
development company, but it quickly moved into the new media field producing intranets and 
websites for corporate and university clients.  NetKnowHow acquired a reputation for excellence 
in retail e-commerce after its website for a famous department store won a prize for an 
outstanding e-commerce site.  In 1999, while continuing to build retail e-commerce sites for 
nationally recognized corporate clients, it also built sites for startup dot.coms (striking 
partnerships with several of these) and merged with another smaller startup in the field of digital 
kiosks.  In 2000, it stopped taking on dot.com clients, focusing instead on consulting for “click 
and mortar” operations that combined physical and digital retailing while experimenting on the 
side in developing applications for the wireless interface.  Like the overwhelming majority of 
new media startups in Silicon Alley, it had no venture capital funding; and, also like the majority 
of new media firms during the period prior to the industry’s downward spiral beginning in  April 
2000,4 it was a profitable company.  Also, like almost all firms in this sector, it is struggling in the 
                                                 
3 A young business strategist in a leading new media consulting firm in Silicon Alley grasped the problem 
intuitively. When I asked whether he can speak the language of the designers and technologists on his 
project teams, he responded that he frequently does. But then he paused for a moment and added, “But I 
don’t always do so. If I always talked to the technologist on his own terms, then he would never understand 
me.”  
 
4 NYNMA 1999 survey.  April 14, 2000 marked the first dramatic drop in Internet stocks.  
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wake of the dot.com meltdown.  When we began our ethnographic research in the spring of 1999, 
NetKnowHow had about 15 employees.  Within eighteen months it had grown to over a hundred 
employees but has subsequently declined, in three rounds of layoffs, to about 40.   Very painful, 
this survival is itself an accomplishment in circumstances where much larger and much better 
financed companies have bit the dust.  
 
The physical setting of our research was in the Flatiron District, at the core of Silicon Alley. At 
the point of its maximum growth, NetKnowHow occupied four workplaces each several blocks 
apart – lofts converted from displaced printing operations with as many as thirty computer 
workstations in an open room where no walls, dividers, or cubicles separated the programmers, 
designers, information architects, and business strategists.  It was not just open, but so closely 
packed that almost anyone could reach out and literally touch someone.  And, like a construction 
site, it was a place in movement. Although there were periods, typically mid-morning and mid-
afternoon, where it seemed that everyone was still, each concentrating on his or her own monitor, 
for much of the time the rooms seemed in motion with dozens of micro-meetings in twos or 
threes, some sitting, others standing, leaning over shoulders to point at lines of code or graphics 
on their monitors, some lasting 30 minutes, many only 30 seconds. Some formal project meetings 
took place around large tables in the conference rooms; but just as often, a project team would 
claim a part of the open room by wheeling chairs and sitting on tables around several 
workstations.  For the most intense discussions, you could go to one of the “private conference 
rooms” in the stairways and on the fire escape where smokers congregated.   
 
The social setting of our ethnography, like the de rigueur hardwood floors, was Silicon Alley 
standard: the workforce of NetKnowHow was tightly grouped around its median age of 27. But 
its demographics departed from the typical new media startup with a higher proportion of women 
and a broader ethnic and racial mix.  The following job listing indicates the qualities that 
NetKnowHow was seeking in its employees. For this programmer position, beyond the obvious 
technical qualifications, it seeks “team players” who “take pride in their work” and who can 
thrive in its “flat organizational structure.”   
 
NetKnowHow, Inc. seeks Cold Fusion/ASP/MS SiteBuilder (or CGI/Perl) programmers 
with proven experience developing a wide range of leading-edge Internet systems. The 
ideal candidate will have experience in database design and development 
(Oracle/SQLServer) and strong HTML and JavaScript skills. Team players must be able 
to juggle multiple projects, prioritize to meet client needs and established deadlines.  
Requirements include one year solid experience programming in Cold Fusion or 
equivalent language, as well as familiarity with database systems (MS Access, MS SQL 
Server, Informix and Oracle).  We are looking for quality people who take pride in their 
work and enjoy working in an eclectic, hard-working and creative environment. If you’re 
interested in beginning a career with a cutting edge new media company, drop us a line. 
NetKnowHow’s flat organizational structure permits self-starters to thrive. Benefits 
include medical, dental, 401-k and gym membership. If you have something special to 
contribute, submit your résumé and a cover letter describing your work experience and 
what you think you could bring to NetKnowHow’s table, to 
recruiting@NetKnowHow.com.   [emphasis added] 
 
Reflecting the casual work environment, NetKnowHow’s refrigerators were well-stocked with 
soda, juice, and beer.  And like a construction site, the place was frequently noisy – not from 
crane engines and jackhammers but from the music that provided a nonstop umbrella of sound 
over the low hum of many conversations.  In this setting, the counterpart of a hard hat was a 
headset wired to one’s own music as some protection against the din and as a signal “not to be 
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interrupted.”  If the work atmosphere was casual, the actual work was intense and the hours long. 
Both hours and intensity increased with the approach of a project deadline and reached manic 
levels each autumn when the hardwood floors were littered with futons and mattresses as 
NetKnowHow’s employees worked literally day and night to build e-commerce sites that could 
be launched for the holiday buying season.  Like pre-industrial work rhythms5 with bouts of work 
followed by relative idleness, rush work to meet deadlines could be followed by less intense 
periods “between projects,” but these were typically short. Opportunities for “learning by 
watching” (Grabher 2001) were limited where the general rule was “learning by doing” – for 
there was nothing pre-industrial about the overall experience of temporality.  In the new media 
field, there was no sense of a “passage of time.”  Instead, time was compressed; like a time-warp 
it was something that you were being shot through.  
 
The web of a web project 
 
The process of designing and building a website at NewKnowHow, as in new media firms 
generally, takes the organizational form of a project.  A project is not a permanent construct but a 
temporary ensemble whose players had been working on other projects before and will move to 
other projects after its conclusion.  Together with every new media firm we encountered in 
Silicon Alley, NetKnowHow devotes considerable energy not simply to monitoring projects 
(“building accountability of the project and in the project”) but also to monitoring the project 
process (“codifying our practice,” “institutionalizing our process,” etc.) – in part as marketing 
strategy (“The Razorfish 5 Step Process”), in part because the project form is a critical component 
of the core competence of these firms. 
 
Some projects last no more than a month. Some, whether because of their innate complexity or 
because of indecision or insolvency on the client side, can last five or six months.  The typically 
sophisticated project runs 60-90 days, and this extraordinarily compressed time to market is an 
important factor in project dynamics.  Projects can bring earnings to the firm ranging from several 
hundred thousand to nearly a million dollars.  Project fee structures can vary: NetKnowHow has 
sometimes contracted fixed fees, sometimes adopted a retainer model, and sometimes taken 
equity in lieu of partially defrayed or deferred fees.  More typically, it negotiates overall price 
estimates based on material expenses plus billable hours.  
 
On the firm’s side, the participants in a project include business strategists, interactive designers, 
programmers and other technologists, information architects (IA), and merchandising specialists.  
Each project has a project manager; most projects will include a designated design lead and 
technology lead, and larger projects will designate a lead information architect as well as a lead 
business strategist.   While they are temporarily the “members” of project, personnel remain part 
of an ongoing functional unit (e.g., design, programming, IA, strategy, etc.)  variously referred to 
as “communities,” “disciplines,” or “guilds,” but most frequently called “teams” or “groups” 
(e.g., “the design team,”  “the technology group,” etc.).       
 
Although everyone at NewKnowHow would prefer that people be assigned to only one project at 
any given time, the exigencies of this poorly capitalized firm (and its billable hours revenue 
structure) frequently require that personnel work on multiple projects simultaneously. This fact 
creates time-allocation problems (and the need for cross-project cooperation) among project 
managers. Moreover, it repeatedly short circuits the ongoing discussion about the principles 
                                                 
5 See E.P. Thompson, “Time, Work, and Industrial Capitalism.”   
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guiding the physical layout of the firm, specifically, whether personnel should be spatially 
grouped by project or by team.  
 
A project, of course, is a project for a particular client.  To an important extent it is also a project 
with a client.   In some cases, representatives of the client are a part of the project.  
NetKnowHow’s project managers and members are aware that “the client” is itself a complex 
entity in which different parties have different, and even conflicting, interests. When working 
with a large retail chain, for example, the proximate “client” might be a new online unit that is 
itself involved in turf wars and budget battles inside its own organization.  Similarly, the 
marketing department, financial services, warehousing, and production units that are a part of 
“the client” can have different stakes in the (definitions of) success or failure of the venture.  
Thus, when NetKnowHow’s project members (and not simply project managers) phone, email, or 
instant message their counterparts in the client organization for technical information (e.g., a 
programmer gets  in touch with a database manager in the client’s “legacy” system or a 
merchandizing specialist calls a marketing manager) such contacts can also be opportunities for 
intelligence gathering.7  
 
Motivated in part by the recognition of these complexities, some clients are hiring independent 
contractors who specialize in the role of interface between the corporation and the web 
development project. Thus, just at the time that NetKnowHow and its competitors are acquiring 
the skills of “managing the client,” their corporate clients are hiring a new type of professional 
whose skills are to manage the representations of the client (on one side) and manage the project 
managers (on the other).  From the vantage point of Internet companies like NetKnowHow, such 
developments are a mixed blessing.   The injunction that only one person speaks definitively for 
the client (and a corporate “outsider” at that) can be potentially positive because nothing can be 
more disastrous for a project than to operate with erroneous or conflicting ideas of the client 
firm’s intentions.8  But, at the same time, since “the client” is likely to have multiple (and even 
competing) objectives, the reduction to a single channel can result in messages that are difficult to 
decipher in the absence of multiple sources of information that make real interpretation possible. 
That is, mixed messages are likely, whether from one source or many. The challenge for the 
project is to construct from these mixed messages a relatively robust picture of the client, with 
enough depth of focus to commit resources and yet fuzzy enough to anticipate potential changes 
in direction or to facilitate quick adaptation to the unanticipated.9 
 
These interactions, whether tactically technical or strategically organizational, are part of the web 
of a web project.   A more complete elaboration of the network of a web project would include:  
technology “partners” (licensing and other arrangements through which the web developer can 
                                                 
 
7 Small worlds dynamics here.  Even when the client is not located in NYC, programmers (or other 
specializations for that matter) are in networks – school ties, Special Interest Groups (SIGs), immigrant 
communities, listserves, Instant Message buddy lists, bulletin boards, chat rooms – that make it relatively 
easy to open direct lines of communication to counterparts in the client’s organization.   
 
8 It was for this reason that NetKnowHow inaugurated a counter injunction that only the project manager 
could speak to the client (reversing its earlier policy that any project member could speak to the client).  
For reasons addressed below, this injunction did not hold. 
  
9 The need for exchanging “technical information” throughout the course of the project, as we shall see, 
results in multiple channels for information, disinformation, and the rumor and noise that facilitates 
interpretation, despite official injunctions from whichever side.   
 
 15 
offer access and support for new technologies);  hardware and network affiliations through which 
the web developer offers server space, maintenance, and network security; venture capitalists, 
whether brought from the side of the client or brought to the client by the web developer;  other 
web development firms (when different parts of a project are distributed among different firms or 
when the firm elects to subcontract parts of the project to other firms); vendors to the client 
(whose information systems must be reconciled with the categories and the functionalities of the 
site); order fulfillment firms, credit services, and so on.   Intelligence is distributed across this 
web. We turn to the knowledge networks and lateral accountability within the project more 
narrowly defined.  
 
 
Distributing Intelligence: Collaborative Engineering as Emergent Design 
 
The life cycle of a web project typically has a preformative, “preproject,” stage of matching firm 
and client – more informal in the early days of the company, later somewhat formalized in its 
marketing or business development (Biz Dev) unit – followed by stages of identifying the project 
personnel, a formal “kickoff,” planning and site design, production, testing, soft launch, and a 
celebration at hard launch.  Figure 1 presents a diagram of a typical project life cycle at 
NetKnowHow.   
 
 
From the idealized representation in Figure 1, it might seem that building a website is a matter of 
sequential engineering: in principle, all design and engineering should be completed before 
production begins.  Within an overall sequentiality the diagram shows distinct moments of 
parallel engineering, for example, during weeks 3-5 when the information architectures, technical 
architects, and graphic designers work in parallel to draw up their plans for the site which are then 
“handed off” to the site builders.  In the actual process, however, engineering is more 
simultaneous than sequential. At NetKnowHow, website construction is a process of 
collaborative engineering.  
 
An industry in which there can be extraordinary first mover advantages creates strong pressures 
to be quick-to-market. The results are excruciatingly tight project deadlines that force production 
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to begin before design is completed. Typically, the database managers and other programmers 
begin construction just as soon as they hear initial ideas about the project.  Of course, they are not 
literally writing each of the many thousands of lines of code from scratch, but are looking to 
previous work to find promising templates for the various functionalities that are likely to be 
adopted for the project.  At the same time that they are searching through their existing stock of 
code, they are also searching for solutions to the new functionalities that were discussed in the 
kickoff meeting (as well as those that were not even mentioned there but which they are literally 
overhearing in the close quarters of the open workplace). If they started programming only after 
the information architect presented them with the finished “wire frame”10 (a kind of blueprint 
specifying each part of the website and their inter-relations), the project could never be completed 
on deadline. Similarly, the information architect is consulting with the programmers about the 
code that they are already preparing, hearing their proposals about new solutions to old problems, 
and picking up new ideas that could be adopted in the site.  Without such iteration, she might 
draw up an exquisite wire frame – but one that could not be completed on time and on budget.  In 
short, production workers participate in design as a process that involves bricolage (Garud and 
Karnoe 2001).       
 
If production begins before design is completed, it is also the case that design is ongoing, 
continuing almost to the point that production is completed.  First, even with the best efforts to 
manage the client’s expectations and even within a project cycle as short as 90 days, it is nearly 
impossible to prevent “project creep” – the ratcheting up of project specifications.  Because 
clients learn during the process of building the site, they will demand new functionalities.  Some 
can be resisted (“that’s not in the project specifications”).  But they cannot all be deflected, 
especially when the firm has promised a “cutting edge” website and the client now sees a 
competitor’s site with new features that “have to be adopted.”   From a narrow business logic, 
new functionalities can be incorporated with a corresponding increase in price (“yes, but it will 
increase the programming costs dramatically”).  But from a design perspective, introducing new 
features can have enormous implications that ramify throughout the site.  Seemingly simple 
changes in the order of steps within “check-out,” for example, might require major restructuring 
of the database.   
 
But there is a second, more important, reason why design – as the work of figuring out the whole 
– can continue well through the production process, even when no additional functionalities are 
introduced after the initial stages.  Because of the rapid pace of organizational, technological, and 
genre innovations, website construction at NetKnowHow was almost always a process of 
engineering something they had not built before. Even when the project could benefit from 
utilizing existing templates, the particular combinations were likely to be novel, and likely to 
incorporate novel elements as well.  Moreover, at NetKnowHow, learning was by doing.  That is, 
instead of understanding a technology and then adopting it, one came to understand a technology 
by using it.  As a result, the process of figuring out how all the pieces fit together did not take 
place in the initial “design” phase but, instead, occurred during and through the process of 
constructing the site.  “It’s like a  puzzle,” explained Aaron, age 27, one of the firm’s two most 
senior project leads, “but it’s peculiar because the picture on the cover keeps changing as you put 
it together.”  The passage from our conversation deserves quoting verbatim:  
 
Early on in the project you have a kick off meeting and you do have an understanding 
of the project up front.  You have a sense of what the project is, the size of it, the scope 
                                                 
10 The wire frame is an example of a “boundary object” (Star and Griesemer 1989) – stable enough to 
circulate, ambiguous enough to be an object of multiple meanings. 
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of it, and everything else.  But as soon as that kick-off meeting is over, that whole 
concept just … [throws up his hands]. It's like a puzzle – you  see the cover of the box, 
you know what the puzzle is supposed to look like, you have a really good idea of what 
you need to do, but then you open the box, you just see all those pieces, and then you 
have to start putting all those pieces together.  
 
In trying to figure out how the puzzle pieces might fit together, the wireframes are not 
much help because the projects are always so fluid and there are always so many 
changes you have to go through, regardless. Every client wants changes; every project 
leader encounters some complexity that requires a change; so the deeper you go into 
changes, the farther you get from the realization.  You'll have the puzzle pieces, and 
then someone will dump a whole other 50 or 100 pieces into your lap. And when they 
dump the additional pieces in your lap, you also don't know how those fifty pieces 
relate to the cover on the box, you don't know if it's the bottom, on the side, on the top, 
or the left.  But you do know that what you're going to end up with is not like the initial 
picture you started with at the kick-off meeting, because you change so much. 
 
No matter how many new changes come across, for every new change you can tie up 
and get your arms around, get a resolution to, and get it implemented, then that actually 
serves to be a greater step towards the realization than just figuring out how the two 
pieces you had in the beginning fit together the way that you thought they would, 
because it's now more like you're getting these undefined pieces and you're able to 
define them and that sort of leap frogs you toward that realization. At some point when 
you get all of those changes done and a good portion of the rest of it done and at that 
point, that's usually when I have that realization that YES! I see what it is that we're 
doing now.  I have a good understanding of the whole thing and what it's going to end 
up looking like. For me it usually happens towards the end. 
           
In these observations, Aaron is expressing a view that design is an emergent process, distributed 
across many actors in a highly interactive way. And, like design, innovation is not a moment that 
occurs at a particular stage in the web development process.  At NetKnowHow, innovation is not 
an activity confined to an R&D department.  Every unit, indeed everyone, is involved in the 
process of innovation as an immensely pragmatic activity of collaborating to “figure out how it 
fits together.”  In short, instead of the conventional view of innovation by design, in these website 
construction projects we find design by innovation.  As an self-organized, emergent process, it is 
not engineered from above.   
 
To understand the complexities of “figuring out how it fits together” we need to go beyond the 
simple “front end/back end” dichotomy that figures so prominently in discussions of websites. 
The distinction exists in the folk categories of the web:  the “front end” is what you, the end user, 
experience when you go to a website, but it’s like the tip of the iceberg; the “back end” is 
everything you don’t see below the water line, but which makes it work. The distinction is 
meaningful, but misleading – especially if it connotes website construction as parallel processes 
that have to be made to converge or leads to metaphors in which the “front end” people 
(designers and such) are building a bridge from one side, the back end people (programmers) are 
building from another side, and they have to meet in the middle.  Their interdependencies are, of 
course, much greater.   
 
In the simple version of the front/back end model, there are two computers and one interface: the 
server where the code of the website is resident, your PC, and the graphical user interface (GUI) 
through which you experience the site. But sophisticated e-commerce sites involve many 
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computers and multiple interfaces – yours, the servers leased by the client of the web developer, 
the mainframes on which the client’s multiple data bases are operating, as well as the computers 
of the client’s suppliers and vendors, the computers of the order fulfillment service, credit card 
companies, and so on.  Your click as end user can initiate a purchase, create a delivery form, enter 
a credit card payment, provide feedback to marketing, and route an order directly to a supplier.  
Some sophisticated e-commerce sites reach deeply into the production and inventory systems of 
multiple suppliers and use algorithms (with weights for the suppliers’ price, location, level of  
inventory, opening or closing phases of production runs, and even the quality of the suppliers’ 
data) to determine which supplier will fill a particular customer’s on-line purchase.   
 
The challenge for the website developers is to build a site in which the activities of the end user 
are seamlessly linked to the various other computers to which the site is interfaced.  The 
performance of the website critically depends on the performance of an actor – the user – whose 
actions might be anticipated but cannot be controlled.  It is this interdependence that most 
dramatically increases the interdependencies among the website construction crew.  A 
programmer can design a beautiful interface between the website and the suppliers, but she needs 
to make sure that it doesn’t interfere with how the information architect is thinking about 
navigational issues for the interface to the user. The more the site is truly interactive, the more the 
various parts of the team must interact.  A change in the categories of the database, for example, 
can change parameters for the graphic designers and vice versa.  The more the intelligence of the 
site is distributed – including, most critically, the user’s intelligence – the more the construction 
site must use a distributed intelligence among the team in collective problem solving.  When 
graphic designers and database programmers speak, the phrase “being on the same page” can 
refer to an injunction to focus on the same problem, a request to consider how an action will have 
consequences in another sphere, an opportunity to bring each other up-to-date on new methods, 
applications, functions, and reporting systems as well as quite literally being on the same page of 
code.  The more they must take into account how their actions will shape the parameters of 
others, the more they must increase the lines of lateral accountability.  As a young programmer 
explained to us in an apt epigram for collaborative engineering:  “In this company, I’m 





Multiple performance criteria 
 
The directionality of accountabilities in heterarchical organizations such as NetKnowHow is 
lateral.  But these accountabilities are not of a singular logic.   These are sites where evaluative 
principles operate in multiple registers.          
 
Questions of value – the value of work and the value of the product of work – are central to a web 
project. At NetKnowHow, some criteria of worth are shared across all communities. Formal 
credentials are unimportant; actual skills are critical. Not surprisingly, in this project-based 
organization, an ability to work well with others is highly valued. This trait has several 
components.  First, an ability to get along with others in an extraordinarily stressful and fast-pace 
environment.11 Knowing the subtle cues for when and how you can interrupt is one of the skills 
                                                 
11 As academics we might think about this as a collegial respect, but that would miss the physical 
dimension of working in such close proximity.  Imagine 5 people all working together in a space the size 
of your office, if you have a big office imagine 10, and then you’ll get the idea.           
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relevant in this area.  Second, an ability to convey knowledge (whether explicit or tacit) to others. 
Finally, and most ubiquitous, an ability to figure things out quickly.  As important as (and for 
some even more important than) one’s absolute or relative knowledge is the rate of acquiring new 
skills and knowledge as well as being talented in being able to re-think a problem so that it can be 
solved. “Picking things up quickly” is highly valued whether within a community of practice or 
across them.12  
 
However, not all criteria of worth are shared.  The different communities of practice at 
NewKnowHow differ in their conceptions of value and in their measures of performance:  
 
For programmers, a good programmer is above all logical, and a good site must be judged by 
the same criterion. When she performs well, she does so with speed, efficiency, and accuracy; 
and a good website must do the same.   A good programmer can translate – express a 
functionality in the language of a computer code that is categorical and hierarchical.  A good 
programmer understands the deep structure as well as the quirks and idiosyncrasies of the 
program.  When she speaks it is not simply on behalf of other programmers but on behalf of the 
program.  The legitimate tests and proofs of worth are Quality Assurance tests and other 
instruments that measure the speed, efficiency, security, and reliability of the site.   
 
For designers, a valuable designer must be knowledgeable about processes of  perception, and a 
good website must use graphic cues that conform to these processes.   When he performs well, he 
does so with creativity, and the results will be exciting and stimulating. A good designer is also a 
translator – into a language that is visual, intuitive, and interactive.   At work he engages in a 
visual dialogue with other designers, the client, and users.  When this work of translation is 
successful it makes links to the imagination because both the client and the user live not only in a 
real world and a virtual world but also in imaginary worlds. The designer’s translation creates 
multiple links among all these – in the process, making connections between the self-image of the 
client and that of the user.  Exploiting interactive as well as visual features, he creates the overall 
“look and feel” through which the site achieves the desired effects/affects and conveys a branding 
experience.  If necessary, he has authority to argue with the client provided he speaks as an 
advocate of the brand. Winning clients, winning audiences, and winning competitions are 
legitimate proofs of worth.  
 
For information architects,  a good information architect must be knowledgeable about 
principles of cognition.  A site that successfully applies these principles will be characterized by 
clarity, ease, and above all usability.  A good website conveys information by creating navigable 
pathways that conform to cognitive pathways. An information architect’s activities are valuable 
because they are based on studies that use statistics to understand user behavior.   In discussions 
with other members of the project, including the client, the information architect is an advocate of 
the user.  The user lives in a world of information that is accessed through tools some of which 
are more and some of which are less appropriate for the tasks that the user attempts to perform.  
“Conversion rates” and other statistical metrics of user activities are legitimate tests of a website’s 
performance.      
 
                                                 
12 In 2000 NetKnowHow initiated a formal evaluation process for all employees.  Each employee was able 
to choose five co-workers to write evaluations.  “Picking things up quickly” was one of the most frequently 
mentioned positive traits.  The summary statements below draw from these evaluations, as well as from our 
field interviews and observations.   
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For merchandising specialists, a good website is one that moves product.  To do so, a good 
online merchandiser exploits powers of suggestion. Because the shopper lives in a world of 
desire, she is open to suggestion.  Playfulness takes precedence over information, surprise takes 
precedence over search, product placement takes precedence over navigation, and pleasurability 
takes precedence over usability.   Proofs of value are metrics that measure how product is moving 
in relation to inventories.    
 
 
Ok, it works, but how does it perform?   
 
In the section on collaborative engineering we focused on the pragmatic activity of figuring out 
how everything fits together.  But collaborative engineering also involves the discursive activity 
of evaluating how it performs.   
 
You build a website that works. But, as more websites get built, you cannot make a distinction 
between yours and others’ simply on the grounds that yours works.  You say that yours performs 
better. But then immediately you must begin to articulate your performance criteria.13 You cannot 
silence the talk about evaluative principles and point to a purely pragmatic frame since your claim 
that you are making a valuable product raises the question not only of what is its value but why.    
 
The various communities of practice at NetKnowHow were articulate and adamant about their 
respective performance criteria.  “We yell and scream” was a repeated refrain in conversations 
when we talked about this friendly rivalry.  Discussions could be heated, especially when proofs 
of worth (Boltanski and Thevenot 1991) were not immediately recognized outside of the frames 
that made them seem so obvious to their proponents.  The statistical studies on user behavior 
produced by the leading information architect, for example, were characterized by a leading 
designer as “arbitrary,” provoking the counter-charge that this was yet another instance in which 
he, the designer, was being “irrational.”   
 
Despite occasional flare-ups, the temperature stayed cool since the dominant mode was 
persuasion rather than denunciation.  Because every community of practice was a minority view, 
each attempted to enlist or enroll others in recognizing the legitimacy of their performance 
criteria.   In this process of ongoing realignment (Latour 1986, 1991), people spoke openly about 
seeking allies.        
 
We saw this process at work, for example, in a dispute over competing claims about who could 
speak on behalf of “the user” that ranged for many months at NetKnowHow and was still ongoing 
when we concluded our field work.  This development was triggered by the information 
architects who thought that they had a special claim on knowledge about the user.  Their hope 
was that every group would start focusing on the user’s performance and that by, maintaining 
their special definition, they could raise their own performance criteria to a special status to which 
all groups gave credence.  The information architects’ strategy was initially successful: as 
references to “the user” indeed circulated through the company, we could hear this theme more 
and more frequently in discussions, formal and informal.  
 
But the strategy also had consequences unintended by the information architects: instead of 
deferring to the information architects, each of the disciplines began to articulate their own 
definitions of the user consistent with their value systems and metrics of performance.  That is, 
                                                 
13 See Hennion (1997) for a fascinating analysis of performance criteria in the field of popular music.   
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each community developed its own distinctive claims to represent the user.  The merchandizing 
specialists, who had previously seemed to be speaking on behalf of the merchandiser, offered 
seminars in which they presented their view of the user as “shopper” and mobilized an alternative 
set of findings.  Similarly, the firm’s leading designer, who was genuinely most attentive to the 
studies of the information architects, came to the defense of the designer who had derided them as 
“arbitrary,” pointing out that these statistical studies were conducted at a particular stage of the 
development of the web.  In a variety of settings, he suggested new directions in the evolution of 
the web that could make these findings obsolete.  And, more quietly but quite forcefully in their 
individual interactions with the other communities, even the programmers began to articulate 
their own representation of the user.           
 
Disputes such as this were vital for firms like NetKnowHow.  If the firm locked-in to a single 
performance criteria, it could not be positioned to move with flexibility as the industry changed 
and the web evolved.  Thus, even the principle we have not yet mentioned – profitability – was 
not itself an evaluative principle that trumped all others since continuing profitability was itself 
based on the ability to anticipate new developments and re-cognize new performance criteria for 
evaluating well-designed and well-functioning websites.   Tolerating, even encouraging, such 




To build a site, make settlements.   
 
Collaborative engineering is a discursive pragmatics. It is, at once, an ongoing conversation and 
an intensely practical activity.  I present to you accounts of my work so that you can take my 
problems and goals into account in yours.  We do what works to make it work.  We need to talk 
to get the job done, but to get the job done we need to stop talking and get to work.  We give 
reasons, we explain the rationale, but we use different rationalities.   We do not end disputation so 
much as suspend it.  To build sites, we make settlements.  
 
Settlement of the web and settlement in web projects share some common features, not least 
because the two dynamics are recursive.   As a frontier, the web is going through a process of 
settlement.14  It’s not simply that sites are built, but that they are built in settlements.  Landscapes 
are reshaped and structures are recognizable by their contours.   We can distinguish an e-
commerce site from a portal site from an informational site.  Things get settled.   
 
For the members of web projects, the process of building websites has the result that things also 
get settled.  From a very low division of labor, some professional boundaries develop.  It is 
possible to recognize a graphic designer from a business strategist from an information architect. 
Things settle down, people settle in.  They work out ways of dividing tasks and managing the 
relationships across their professional boundaries.  On many issues they reach agreement.   
 
But you can’t settle back in your ergonomic chair too long – because, unlike settlements on 
physical landscapes, things don’t stay settled on the web.  (Or at least they have not during the 
period we are experiencing.)  The built structures on the digital landscape lack the permanence of 
physical structures.  An abandoned warehouse is a boarded-up blight on the landscape until it is 
destroyed or gentrified into luxury apartments.  An abandoned website is a Code 404, File “Not 
                                                 
14 On settlement, see the extraordinarily rich and insightful analysis of online newspapers by Pablo 
Boczkowski (2000).   
 
 22 
Found.”  Websites can be destroyed with ease and new ones created.  Repurposing takes more 
work,15 but in general the process of recombining forms takes place with marked rapidity when 
working in the digital medium.16  Thus, just when we thought we could easily recognize the 
difference between e-commerce sites, portal sites, and information sites, fusions began that 
confused the distinctions.  AOL’s mall of affiliated storefronts began to double as a portal, the 
Yahoo portal adopted e-commerce features, and we can go to the dominant e-commerce site, 
Amazon, for information and for its affiliated shops.17  Things might be settling down, but they 
are not settled.   
 
Life in web projects is much the same.  Sometimes the parties actually come to agree.  But 
frequently, instead of reaching an agreement, they reach a settlement. Like the term itself with its 
connotations of law and locality, our informants at NetKnowHow reach settlements  1) by 
judicious appeals to other actors who are outside the dispute, and 2) through their highly localized 
practices.  When the incommensurable systems of value come into conflict in a project they are 
sometimes settled by contingent compromises (often through appeals to the project lead) and by 
“relativization” (through appeals to the client).  In relativization (Boltanski and Thevenot 1991),  
the parties to the disagreement can maintain their principled position; they merely agree to accede 
to whatever outcome is chosen by the “outsider.”  “So, it’s settled, right?”  The highly localized 
practices of the project, so confined in space and time, further contribute to temporary 
settlements. Working in such tight quarters creates a forced intimacy and a heightened tolerance.  
Where everything is overheard and everyone is monitoring not only what is said but also the tone 
of voice, project team members are on the alert for a pitch of voice that signals an unproductive 
impasse. “Ok, let’s settle this and get back to work.”  Deadlines have a way of settling 
disagreements.        
 
Not surprisingly like those on the landscape of the web, these settlements are more provisional 





The provisional character of project settlements is an expression of discursive pragmatism.  
Pragmatic, because provisional settlements make it possible to get the job done.  Discursive, 
because provisional settlements are open to reinterpretation when the project is concluded and the 
next begun.   
 
Our understanding of collaboration in heterarchical organizations is thus more complex than 
coordination within a project.  A frictionless coordination, in which everyone shared the same 
performance criteria, might make life smooth for project managers; but it would lose the creative 
                                                 
15 The analogy to physical buildings and landscapes has merit when we move from destruction (almost 
without cost in the digital case) to repurposing.  Sites like Amazon, Yahoo, and AOL can be rebuilt only 
with considerable investment.  Like newsmagazines, they can be cosmetically redesigned with some 
frequency; but changing their form and functionality is a major operation that is fraught with difficulties.  
Witness the calamity at Deja.com.   
 
16  Even in the digital environment, relative stabilizations occur because of investment in forms (Thevenot 
1984).  Genre forms are malleable but not infinitely so.     
 
17 The full list is much longer:  the leading software distributor, Microsoft, starts its own network, and so 
on.  Population ecology distinctions between generalists and specialists only capture part of these 
dynamics. 
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abrasions (Brown and Duguid 1998) that are the source of ongoing vitality.  Settlements facilitate 
coordination within projects; the unsettling activity of ongoing disputation makes it possible to 
adapt to the changing topography of the web across projects in time.  Friction promotes 
reflection, exposing variation from multiple perspectives.  
 
The type of complex coordination of a discursive pragmatics thus differs from the silent 
coordination of circulating boundary objects (Star and Griesemer 1989).  It is not enough to note 
that coordination occurs among heterogeneous actors.  We should be attentive to their work of 
persuasion as they offer competing performance criteria justified by heterogeneous evaluative 
principles.  In doing so, we see multivocality not as the property of a position that is structurally 
privileged by its location as a unique intersection of multiple networks (Padgett and Ansell 1993)  
but as a property of an organization. Entrepreneurship is not brokering difference between 
otherwise disconnected identities but instead occurs at sites where identities and their competing 
orders of worth are densely interacting.  Complex coordination is a function not only of the 
values we share or of the language we have in common (Galison 1997) but also of our creative 
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